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1. Introduction 
A brief glace at the electricity market and considering the methods of supervising its 
exploitations in different countries illustrate that this market had been managed 
monopolistically by governments for several years. Regarding restructuring and evolution 
in the electricity markets happened in many countries in recent years, it is necessary to 
achieve methodologies in which some trends like market power could be analyzed (Heydari 
K. 2003). Then decision makers can easily make some decision to prevented unfair behaviors 
in electricity market and direct it to a pure competitive condition. 
A competitive market is characterized as: 
1. When a quantity of production of a producer reduced, simply, another producer could 
replace that. It means that there is an appropriate reservation in the network. 
2. New producers could enter to the market easily. 
3. The numbers of competitors are enough. It means that they sell their production 
according to the market price and it also mean that it is them that put the price and no 
company could change the price by changing the quantity of its production. 
4. Market and production information are available as free for sellers and buyers. 
Although the attempt to achieve a completely competitive market has not been succeed but 
it improved the condition of this market considerably. In this way presenting the proper 
definition of the market, recognizing present markets and relationship between these 
markets is necessary. Without it, any assessment regarding the market power and changing 
prices could result confusion in market activities. Furthermore because of particular 
characteristic of electricity to be non-storable product in large scale, electricity market has to 
be controlled and monitored by the governments to detect and prevent exercising any 
market power. In order to achieve this goal, there are some controls and antitrust activities 
which are done inside and outside of electricity market. A group of techniques are also 
employed for analysis of prices relation and model design for finding market’s boundaries 
by Granger and SSNIP test. 
In this chapter, the conceptions concerning market definition, market power, SSNIP test (as 
a mechanism for market defining and a good tool for those who provide prices in order to 
identify related markets they are engage it) and granger test (as a statistical technique using 
for defining dependent and independent markets and relations between these markets) are 
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presented and then the market definition and identification for the related markets in a 
sample Electricity market are discussed. Presented models as the prediction mean in 
electricity market are evaluated; finally the results of SSNIP test are compared with the real 
electricity market database. 
2. A review on function of Iran’s electricity market 
Iran’s electricity market has been established in 1382 as a wholesaler market. According to 
electricity market rule, “market adjusting board”, “market manager” and “center” constitute 
three main organs of Iran’s electricity structure. 
Market manager do electricity transaction, in other words daily administrating energy’s 
market. National network leading and searching center or its assistance (national 
dispatching) is responsible for leading country’s electricity network, also it should make 
sure that using this network would be safe and secure. 
Market adjusting board lead and control electricity market to facilitate economic exchanges 
as well as solving disputes among market’s main members. So market adjusting board can 
be labeled as Iran’s electricity market lawmaker organ. Importance of responsibilities and 
jurisdiction, necessitate independency of this organ from market’s members. 
However, the following reasons (especially when the numbers of producers are limited) 
generally cause the prevention of establishment of competitive market in the field of 
electricity: 
1. Impossibility of electricity storage in mass extent 
2. Impossibility of flow power control to desirable course 
3. Not balanced distribution (based on the principle of production and consumption) in comparing 
to other competitive markets: 
In a complete competitive market, despite some limitations, usually production is done 
in the nearest distance from consumption market. But in electricity market production 
takes place in an area that primary facilities such as primary source of energy and work 
force are available and there be no environmental issues. 
4. Absence of balanced transfer and distribution power system establishment: 
Limitations in quantity of transfer lines and distribution of power and also impossibility 
of new line establishment (because of no economic value or environmental issues) are 
considered as some other factors which restrain competition in electricity market. 
5. Other technical difficulties: 
Some difficulties such as limitations power voltage resistance etc could be categorized 
in the section. 
Iran’s electricity market programs is indeed about output and input of units, provided that 
by received information from electricity seller companies some limitations are removed. The 
input information of this program which is within market manager’s jurisdiction is as 
follows: 
- Unit’s megawatt and suggested rate of  produced energy 
- Forecasting network bar: electricity market would have bar information for the whole 
next day. This includes forecasting bar of national network for 24 hours, forecasting 
regional electricity companies peak bar hour and regional peak bar hour. In addition, 
the rate of foreign interchange is known for hour by hour of the next day. The total 
model of Iran’s electricity market is shown at figure 1.  
www.intechopen.com
Identifying Regional Behavior Impacts of Electricity Generation  
in Electricity Market with SSNIP and Granger Test   
 
135 
- Network’s limitations: it includes limitations of interchanging among regions, 
maximum and minimum power stations daily energy, units which should be out and 
on and identification information of power station units.  
The general policy of electricity market program is as follows: 
The program starts to solve a non-linear optimization case regarding the information which 
it has received from seller companies.  
After solving optimization case, the program produces a series output. The most important 
part of them is market production arrangement and average accepted price at each hour. 
The sellers would announce their proposal to market for each power station unit and for 
each day by the hour in maximum 10 steps. The information related to forecasting buyers 
needed service (regional electricity companies) would be announced to market daily and by 
hour too. 
For handling electricity market, there should be received technical information from 
network leading assistance, including power stations produced energy, information of 
interchanging lines, production and code of unit status and peak hour, capability by unit 
and power station, forecasting regional electricity companies bar, frequency fall and rate of 
black-out and the amount of power stations lack of co-operation with control center.  
Figure 1 shows Iran’s electricity market model comparing to standard market (Setayesh 
Nazar M. et al. 2007) Parts who have no boarders has not yet set in motion. 
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Fig. 1. Iran’s electricity market model comparing standard market 
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3. Ways of market’s exercising of authority 
After privatization and changing market’s structure to new ones, usually there would exist a 
phenomenon named “market’s power”. In this phenomenon, seller can change prices to 
gain more benefit than to competitive prices. In U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) market 
power means ability in stabilizing prices at a level upper that competitive level at a known 
time span. So some factors are used to control market power in U.S. electricity market like 
short-term administrating of non-elastic demand (supply and demand in short –term span 
are not elastic, and sometimes this cause privatization and power of market), and 
preventing privatization expenses, etc. So an operating central market is used for 
interchanging in network and rate of access to fuel. Here are listed some key factors which 
prevents market power: 
1. Definition of market and parameters which affect on it 
2. Test on market potential power and evidences about misusing by market power 
3. Enforcing a restriction against those who can exercise authority  
To gain this goal, there are some controls and antitrust activities that are done inside and 
outside of electricity industry, a series of techniques are also employed for analysis of prices 
relation, economic studies and model design for finding market’s boundaries by Granger 
test and SSNIP. 
Main ways of exercising authority by market are: 
1. Physical or quantity restriction which needs intentional reduction of suggesting power 
station unit in market, even if its output be sold higher than final price. This restriction 
can be done by lack of suggestion, reduction of output level or announcement of unit 
output.  
2. Financial or economic restriction which necessitate proposals with prices higher than 
competitive prices. 
3. Transferring system strategies, which involve existing or intensifying transferring 
system repletion for increasing market prices in special regions.  
Electricity markets have a special structure, so just the above mentioned items do not 
confirm existence of market power. Market power in electricity industry means ability of 
restriction for reduction of some units for increasing market prices and more benefit of other 
units. This definition, however, should be revised when we encounter electricity network 
boundaries or lack of mitigation. A company can reduce production of some units and cause 
changes in market prices, so gain more benefits from production of its other units. This is 
possible by output restriction as well as over production of some units (to exercise transport 
limitations) to be benefited by higher prices for other units output. There are some other 
matters which can cause high prices or produce energy for units whose capacity is under 
normal level and total shortage of reservation. 
There are some standards like HHI which are used to recognize existence of market power. 
Lack of suitable definition on market or dependant markets can lead to wrong recognition of 
market power. The standards can be employed in market in two ways: 
1. ex ante: the time of market’s exercising authority 
2. ex post: finding out when market power use its ability in disturbing market. 
These standards should be limited and reduced to control market power. In U.S. these 
limitations are placed according to maximum price and limited   prices, but none of them 
had been successful so far (Frayer J et al. 2004) .This problem cause producers do not tend to 
produce electricity. Totally, employing limitation to all producers in market is not suitable; 
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it should be done just about those who are able to exercise authority on market and not for 
producers of dependant markets. 
4. Definition of market 
There are many techniques for defining market which are used for analysis of each market 
according to its characters. These definitions are offered according to key economic roles of 
each market. 
A separate market enjoys a competitive boarder which separates it from other markets. 
Finding out market’s geographical boarder is possible by estimating whether there is any 
potential for imaginary market power or not. This is done by SSNIP test which is explained 
in next parts in details. 
In economic discussions the way of refracting imaginary monopoly via substituting from 
two views is brought up: 
- How one product beneficiary would react against changing price of different products? 
This discussion is named demand-side substitution. Cross-price elasticity of demand 
which is shown in figure 2 is used to reply this question. 
 
Y X
X Y
Q P
P Q
∆
×
∆
 
Fig. 2. An example of estimating cross-price elasticity of demand 
- How the strategy of other suppliers would change by changing one supplier price? The 
concept of this question is brought up under the title of supply-side substitution too. 
This question can be replied by the concept of cross-price elasticity of supply. 
Now it is possible to define dependent and independent markets by above mentioned 
concepts. 
- Distinct market is a market including a competitive environment different from other 
kinds, so it is impossible to eliminate market power by market exercising authority 
which employs substitution processes. Practical estimation of this market’s 
geographical aspects is done by application of conjectural monopoly policy and SSNIP 
test. 
- Relevant market includes one or more competitive goods. In this market goods can 
compete and be replaced. Even though the monopolist can increase his price to gain 
www.intechopen.com
 Paths to Sustainable Energy 
 
138 
benefit but existence of goods which substitute monopoly ones he cannot .This cause 
products to have little cross-price elasticity of demand. A relevant market compound 
geography and product aspects and define the result as follows: 
- A relevant market compares all products and services which can be substitute by 
consumer because of characteristics of product, its price or way of consumption. 
- A relevant market compare field which companies are worry about offering the 
products or services. 
A traditional definition of market is done based on definition of four aspects of market 
which is shown in fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Four effective aspects in market definition 
Local aspect is determined by distinguishing physical boarders of market. In electricity 
market this aspect is specified by expansion of transport network which is determined by 
market physical boarders. In market, inter connection among generators do not necessarily 
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mean uniform market, but it depends on connective lines between supplier generators in 
that regions. Geographical aspect can be done by SSNIP test. 
Product aspect is determined based on type of that product or service. For example, 
wholesale in electricity market includes various products and services which has been 
provided by generators and suppliers of transport service and is necessary for energy 
wholesale and delivering to consumers. These products can be represented via short-term 
and long-term contractors or sale –point market daily or without delay. Another discussion 
here is about peak hours of electricity production and other hours which are not at peak, 
and whether it is possible to have a separate market for peak hours. For example, lack of 
correlation in supply diagram in electricity market which is shown in three parts in figure 4 
as base load, mid-merit and peak have different offer prices and can show different markets. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Supply diagram in US electricity market 
Time concept among different products of energy indicates the state of transition in these 
markets. Although energy is transported by hour and is measured in little profits, but this 
does not mean market time aspect is one hour or point market (by hour or by five minutes) 
is a separate market. Point markets are not separate ones because monopoly has not effect 
on it and consumers can substitute products which they buy form. 
In markets throughout the world, a remarkable amount of energy wholesale is done by 
contacts of bilateral contracts until three years. This can prevent employing a suitable time 
aspect. 
5. SSNIP test 
In the field of competition rules, before deciding about necessity of companies exercise 
authority and government interference, SSNIP test is done for determining relevant market 
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to a large extent (KATZ  M. 2002). This test analyze potential market exercising authority, by 
analysis of substitute products which  are determinative in relevant markets. In addition, 
competition in market controls market authority. Effective antitrust factors prevent market 
refraction too, by similar industries alliance, group monopoly and goods monopoly.  
Market power is effective when: 
1. consumers do not substitute product  
2. other suppliers do not increase their supply 
This test is used to specify producers who can exercise authority on market or to determine 
relevant markets boarders, somehow means as “something worth monopolizing”. At every 
market there is a list of products which can be substituted. Each list is monopoly value. This 
means if there is only one producer for a product, it can increase its price without ability of 
substituting product by the consumer. This test specifies every relevant market which 
supposed monopoly or collusion of industry owners which can increase prices effectively. 
This test results are more useful than Granger’s test (Frayer J. et al. 2004) and has been used 
in electricity market extensively. 
5.1 SSNIP test history 
This test has been directly defined in 1982 by DOJ as a new method for defining markets 
and a way of measuring market’s power. 
SSNIP test has been used for the first time in 1992 in UN and in 1997 in European 
commission to define relevant market. 
5.2 Method of SSNIP test 
This test is done as follows: 
1. Offering a definition from supposed market based on product, geography, time and 
operation aspects 
2. Making a model from supposed market including a complete definition of relations in 
relevant markets which can exist and describe input, supply and demand of possible 
substitutions at that market 
3. Testing  the effect of supposed monopoly by little increasing of  price ( 5-10 percent) 
Using short-term models in this market is a remarkable point of this test in electricity 
market, so considering time aspect is necessary too. In total, the test limitations (Ogzera 
2005) are as follows: 
1. considering just competition of prices, ignoring other aspects like quality 
2. not being suitable for various kinds of products 
3. possibility of mistake based on base point if market be not symmetrical  
4. Reduction in production rate do not necessarily means its substitution, it may be 
because of not consuming by consumers 
5. In analysis of competition within product A market, just increasing A price would be 
considered. For analysis of monopoly state between A and B (both of them in the same 
market) considering A market is enough.  
6. Consideration of market power is considered as competitive pressure of B on A.  The 
controversy of situation is not necessarily true. 
5.3 Measuring results of SSNIP test  
For consideration gained results following items are used: 
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1. By practical estimation of critical demand elasticity and comparing it with compounded 
demand elasticity ( final price would be enough for linear demand function) 
2. If demand elasticity cannot be measured, a substitute method would be used named 
“critical loss” (Katz M. 2006). Critical loss is maximum wasting of a sale which can 
increase prices effectively. Increasing of prices would be effective when possible loss be 
lesser than critical loss.  
In SSNIP the gained results would be considerable by increasing prices and comparing it 
with base circumstances, and in the same circumstances with base state, increasing transport 
price in lines or exercising time aspect in the base environment. 
6. Granger test  
Granger in 1969 proposed a time-series data based approach in order to determine causality. 
In the Granger-sense x is a cause of y if it is useful in forecasting y. In this framework 
“useful” means that x is able to increase the accuracy of the prediction of y with respect to a 
forecast, considering only past values of y. 
In doing economic analysis, sometimes, we would like to know whether changes in a 
variable will have an impact on changes other variables. To use this phenomenon more 
accurately, we need to learn more about Granger Causality Test. For more information 
about the mathematical basis of this test, (Gujarati N. 1995) is suggested. 
The Granger price test belongs to a genre of statistical techniques used to measure market 
integration and includes more simplified analysis such as correlation and more 
sophisticated techniques such as co-integration analysis and error correction models. The 
base of such tests is derived from Marshallian economic theory, which holds that in open 
markets (prices encapsulate and characterize all supply and demand dynamics). 
Furthermore the Granger causality test takes the analysis of price relationships one step 
further. Suppose you have a regression model explains the current price of a product by 
fitting a curve to the historical prices in time series format of that product ex. electricity. 
Granger’s idea explores whether you could significantly increase the descriptive power of 
this regression analysis for the price of one product by including the price of another 
product. Formally, Granger causality is said to be not present when the relationship 
between two variables, X and Y, when: ( ) ( )_ 1 _ 1 _ 1,t t t t tf X X Y f X X= . 
There are three possible deductions from the econometric analysis: 
• Unidirectional Granger causality from Y to X (or vice versa) 
• Feedback or Bilateral Granger causality 
• Independence 
Granger causality test has also has applied in antitrust cases in the U.S. for the purpose of 
delineating Electricity market boundaries, on a product, geographical, and functional 
dimension by (Frayer J et al. 2004). This test also used for  identifying  of causality of 
California’s electricity and natural-gas (Chi-Keung W. et al 2006), Electricity consumption 
and economic growth (Yemane W. 2006) and many other cases. 
7. Implementation in Iran electricity market 
By considering and administrating Iran electricity market to model it, a complex solution 
should be modeled like transport system limitations and its special circumstances on 
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market. This matter causes analysis and exact simulations. Limitations which controls 
market should be considered completely in its model, otherwise, gained results from 
simulation would not be trustful (Tabei S. M. 2005). Iran’s electricity market have 7 regions 
which each of them enjoys some region regional electricity which is shown in regions (table 
1), in regional electricity (table 2) and in network graphical show in Iran electricity market.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Graphical show of considerable network 
 
Region’s number Region’s name 
1 Azarbaijan 
2 Markazi 
3 Shomal 
4 Khorasan 
5 Sistan 
6 Gharb va bakhtar 
7 Jonobe shargh 
Table 1. Regions of Iran’s electricity market 
Electricity cannot be saved by vast scale and electricity production and distribution 
management should schedule for utilization and optimal investment according to 
comparison of supply with energy demand. Therefore for future projects, foresight of bar 
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have a special importance and its fault rate should be decreased as possible. Therefore, by 
initiating electricity market in Iran network, regional electricity companies should anticipate 
and give whole included network hour by hour consumption needs. This anticipation has 
been done in Iran electricity market by three states: 
1. Anticipation normal days according to finding out similar days 
2. Anticipation special days according to finding out similar days    
3. Anticipation days after special day according to finding out similar days 
 
Region’s number Region’s name 
Number of 
related region 
1 Azarbaijan 1 
2 Esfehan 2 
3 Bakhtar 6 
4 Tehran 3 
5 Khorasan 4 
6 Khozestan 2 
7 Zanjan 3 
8 Semnan 3 
9 Sistan and balochestan 5 
10 Gharb 6 
11 Fars 2 
12 Kerman 7 
13 Gilan 3 
14 Mazandaran 3 
15 Hormozgan 7 
16 Yazd 7 
17 Kish free region  
Table 2. Regional electricity of Iran’s electricity market 
According to analysis done on Iran network bar inputs, bar behavior diagram is different 
during the weak and is similar in back-to- back weeks. Results of anticipation for Iran cross 
country network bar inputs and  comparison with nerves network anticipation alongside 
with master phase system has been shown in figure number 6 till 11 (Vahabi A. et al. 2007). 
According to electricity market rule, hours are distributed according to warm and cold 
months as well as consumption capacity as following table. 
 
Peak hours Normal hours Low bar hours  
21-24 9-20 1-8 Warm months 
18-21 6-17 
1-5 
21-24 
Cold months 
Table 3. Hours distribution based on consumed bar according to electricity market rule 
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Fig. 6. Anticiption diagram and real bar curve for Saturday 
 
 
Fig. 7. Anticiption diagram and real bar curve for Friday 
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Fig. 8. Anticiption diagram and real bar curve for Thursday 
 
 
Fig. 9. Anticiption diagram and real bar curve for Monday 
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Fig. 10. Anticiption diagram and real bar curve for special lunar day 
 
 
Fig. 11. Anticiption diagram and real bar curve for special solar day 
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Network has been distinguished with three different colors as is shown in figure 5. In this 
figure each bas indicate a region in market. A simple network has been simulated by a 
Microsoft (Setayesh Nazar M. et al. 2007), and it has been tried to analyze production and 
lines capacity, their effects on network, and electricity power potential in various states. The 
results show Iran electricity network includes two parts in north and south. After 
considering possibility of market exercising authority and its indicators in each region, some 
ways about reduction of market power in Iran electricity market has been brought up as 
follows: 
1. management of interrupted  bars 
2. increasing number of power stations  
3. increasing of transport lines 
4. accumulation management 
In another simulation model (Izadi F. & Puyan S.A. 2002) done in Iran electricity market, at 
first final expense of each operator is calculated as follows.  
min
1
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
2
sS p p b m p p MW
c
= − = −  
With considering and simulating whole network and each operator behavior, the gained 
benefit of operators would be calculated. In a complete competitive market, it had been 
proved that optimal state of a producer is final proposal as production strategy. This 
simulated model has 5 bas and 4 operators. It has shown at the end that whole market’s 
benefit is decreased when exercising limitations. In addition, the way by which benefit is 
distributed has had considerable changes and operator has removed others from market. 
In another model (Kashani Zade B. et al. 2006) it has been tried to simulate procedure 
strategies, using play theories and considering each operator role on market price. 
Considering this effect on price, supply and benefit of each operator in market comparing 
states lack of limitation between lines and considering lines limitations would be next step. 
Goal of all operators of electricity production in competitive environment is increasing 
production benefit, so procedures would not take any role for consumer. This situation 
necessitate changing market to a competitive one by exercising policies to prevent 
monopoly in market and effect prices based on a special strategy of a procedure. 
8. A review on results on Iran electricity market 
Considering information get from offered prices and each region’s production and demand, 
we would examine above results in Iran electricity market. As mentioned before, consumption 
need do not differ in different month days and in similar hours. Figures 12-18 show price, 
production and demand for four Mondays (4 weeks) from Tir, 1387 on 3 pm (based on 
anticipation at local maximum level for Mondays) for all 7 electricity market region. 
1. Just region number 6 and 7 can produce at a rate more than their demand for all four 
days. In other regions production exceeds demand. 
2. In region number 6 and 7, fluctuation of prices has not been effective on production and 
demand rate, so market can exercise authority. 
3. In regions number 6, especially 7, fluctuation of production and demand is 
considerable, but in other five regions production and demand volume had little 
changes during those four weeks. 
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Fig. 12. Comparing three factors in region 1 
 
 
Fig. 13. Comparing three factors in region 2 
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Fig. 14. Comparing three factors in region 3 
 
 
Fig. 15. Comparing three factors in region 4 
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Fig. 16. Comparing three factors in region 5 
 
 
Fig. 17. Comparing three factors in region 6 
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Fig. 18. Comparing three factors in region 7 
 
 
Fig. 19. Comparing price of four weeks in 7 regions 
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Fig. 20. Comparing production of four weeks in 7 regions 
 
 
Fig. 21. Comparing demand of four weeks in 7 regionsResults of diagrams 12-18 show: 
In figures number 19-21 changes of each price indicator, production and demand is shown 
separately in 7 regions in 4 days. Diagram 19 shows that highest prices alongside with 
lowest fluctuation of regions 2 and 3. Region 4 enjoys lowest price and regions 6 and 7 are 
growing with relatively high fluctuation. 
Production and demand changes in figures 20 and 21 shows coordination between 
production and demand in regions. As seen in these two diagrams just regions number 6 
and 7 can produce at a level higher than region demand, price offered in that regions is at a 
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low level comparing adjacent regions. These factors show these two regions have potential 
for market exercising authority. 
9. Results 
Limiting market power is a necessary parameter for power evolution. For doing this at first 
an exact definition of market helps to recognize existing market power or items which 
market can exercise authority on. 
In this article, SSNIP test has been introduced as a mechanism of defining market, 
recognizing market boarders and potentials for market exercising authority. 
Considering electricity network in Iran and simulated models in Iran electricity market, 
shows potential exercising authority of market. Iran electricity market has 7 regions, from 
which according to information in data base, dependant regions number 6 and 7 can do 
market exercising authority in Iran electricity market. In other five regions recognized as 
dependent markets, providing demands needs presence of other producers in the region. 
Offered price in regions number 2 and 3 is at its highest level comparing others because of 
high demand in those regions. 
According to above results, offering some solutions to prevent market exercising authority 
is necessary. Interrupted bars can decrease system demand in critical circumstances as an 
operation reservation for a short time. These bars can have role in intensifying competitive 
circumstances by growth of system margin and decrease of transport lines accumulation. A 
solution can be growth of power station units as well as departing larger units to smaller 
ones. Lines accumulation is one factor which can motivate market exercising authority. 
Planning for re-production and bar cuts are some ways of lines management. 
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